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A Damn Hard Thing to Do
John Henry Schlegel*
Back in the mid-eighties, I offered a first year, second semester
"un-elective" called American Legal Theory and American Legal
Education. It scrunched together two history courses I had taught
irregularly before. I liked the way the two topics fit together and still
do, but with so many recalcitrant law students enrolled in it, the
course was an unmitigated disaster. As is always the case with such
attempts at offering perspective, amidst the shambles I had acquired
at least a few devoted students. At the end of the last class one of
them came up to the front to ask a somewhat rhetorical question. He
said, "Do I read you correctly? You have been arguing that if we want
to change legal education, we have to change the categories of legal
thought?" I nodded in agreement, to which he replied, "You know
that's gonna be damn hard?"
I remember this comment not just because of the student's
insight but also because it pretty much marked the end to my active
participation in attempts at significantly reforming the curriculum at
the University at Buffalo Law School. An attempt to comprehensively
reform the first-year curriculum had recently broken down when one
crucial participant offered a "my way or the highway" alternative that
none of us could understand. Such a result was a fitting tombstone to
a career that had started back in 1967 when I was a third-year law
student. Gerhard Casper, then new to the University of Chicago Law
School faculty, gathered a group of my classmates together to discuss
revision of that school's curriculum. As a member of this group, I
suggested that the first year be given over to tutorial work designed to
bring all students up to master's degree level of competence in a range
of relevant social sciences. I then suggested that the existing first year
be moved to the second; the existing second, to the third; and the
balance heaved overboard. At the time I did not understand that
Gerhard was already running for dean, but in retrospect, it should
* Professor of Law and Roger and Karen Jones Faculty Scholar, State University of New York at
Buffalo. This piece is for Ken Marvald who understood what generations of reformers of legal
education have not. Bert helped, though in the end it turned out to be help with a future piece.
Except for Bert, all of the rest of my "whole sick crew" was afraid to touch this one.
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have been obvious from his reply to my suggestion: "Mr. Schlegel, we
are here to talk about reform, not revolution!"
Gerhard's comment seemed odd at the time, as I did not think
that I had proposed exterminating the kulaks, but by the end of my
twenty-year run at law school curriculum reform, I had adjusted my
efforts to the more limited objective of understanding why the kulaks
at least thought I had suggested expropriating the expropriators.
From time to time I have offered such limited understandings in
person and in print.' Generally, they have been met not even with a
hostile scowl, but with stolid indifference, though once I generated a
quite angry response from Tony Kronman, who was on that occasion
my host. Still, when Ed Rubin, dean of the Vanderbilt University Law
School, asked that I participate in this conference, true to my
grandfather's reported observation when watching me as a young
child try to force the large pot into the small one-"Determined son-of-
a-gun, isn't he"-I agreed to try again.
Let us begin with familiar territory. One might argue that the
primary obstacle to curricular change is the bar exam, though I
suspect the bar examiners would jump on board were the bar
supportive of a significant change. Or, if not the bar examiners, then
the bar, though I think that the upper echelons only care that we sort
our students enough to save them interview time in the hiring process,
and the lower echelons, that we teach a bit of procedure and the
ability to take directions. Or, if not the bar, then the students, who
after over sixteen years on the academic treadmill prefer to have any
knowledge delivered "straight in the vein," though I note that many
students show a real interest in our present efforts up until they are
exposed to practice in the summer before their second year and might
well continue their interest had not that work experience disabused
them of the notion that the first year of law school was a foundation
for practice. Or, if not the students, then the faculty, who, not wholly
wrongly, fear that significant reform would cause their existing
storehouse of knowledge to be vastly reduced in value and thus
themselves made redundant. Although these are all real obstacles, to
1. See, e.g., Bob Gordon et al., Legal Education Then and Now: Changing Patterns in Legal
Training and in the Relationship of Law Schools to the World Around Them, 47 AM. U. L. REV.
751 (1998); John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the Legal Realists: The
Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1985); John Henry
Schlegel, But Pierre, If We Can't Think Normatively, What Are We to Do?, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV.
955 (2003); John Henry Schlegel, Law and Endangered Species: Is Survival Alone Cause for
Celebration?, 28 IND. L. REV. 391 (1995) [hereinafter Law and Endangered Species]; John Henry
Schlegel, Revenge, or Moon (Over) Your Law School, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 467 (1990); John Henry
Schlegel, Searching for Archimedes - Legal Education, Legal Scholarship and Liberal Ideology,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103 (1984); John Henry Schlegel, Walt Was Right, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 599
(2001).
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my mind, all but the last is generally overrated. Rather, in keeping
with my student's remark, and with a nod to my University of Chicago
Law School heritage, I wish to focus on the impediment presented by
the categories with which law professors think about teaching law.
At the outset, it is important to understand that the basic
categories that we assume today-contract, tort, property, crime,
constitutional law, etc., together with the oppositions of public/private,
individual/state, subjective/objective, rules/standards, substance/
procedure, etc. and of course rights and their lack-are not timeless.
They have a history. For example, Langdell tried to toss constitutional
law out of the law school curriculum in the 1870s, and the course did
not become particularly important until the 1930s. Even then, it was
soon dismembered, when in the 1960s pieces were given over to
various other courses. As late as 1911, John Henry Wigmore
maintained that torts could only be understood by using a category
system common in the mid-nineteenth century that emphasized the
nature of the tortfeasor-railroads, autos, houses, bicycles, factories,
stores, etc. 2 There were no courses in administrative law until the
1910s; neither labor law nor anti-trust became part of the curriculum
until the 1920s, nor federal taxation until the 1930s. The law of sales
was a part of property, namely personal property, and thus organized
in terms of title until the 1960s. So, changing the categories is no big
deal as an historical matter; instead, it is really interesting as such.
In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, law was
primarily organized in terms of the writs that defined the forms of
action at common law, each writ arranged with a body of law
appended to, and coincident with, its scope, the totality looking like a
string of those electrically illuminated icicles that adorn houses at
Christmas time. Blackstone attempted to make sense out of all of this
in the late seventeenth century by explicitly pulling out relationships
of status, and thus dependency-husbandwife, parent/child,
guardian/ward, master/servant, landlordtenant-as had been done
earlier for estates in land and its wills and trusts cognate, future
interests. Then he appended to the resulting structure the notion of
powers absolute within their spheres, designed to keep the British
Crown from interfering both in local affairs and in the economic
transactions of the growing commercial classes. 3
But it was the pleading reforms of the early nineteenth
century, which abolished the writ system, known in this country as
the introduction of code pleading, that brought the question of the
2. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1912).




organization of law, and so of the study of law, to a head. At this time,
some modest attempt was made to reorganize law on the model of
Roman Law, with its basic distinction between persons and things.
This attempt continued even into the early twentieth century, but as
one might guess, the idea did not go anywhere. Instead, after some
finagling, the writs of Trespass on the Case and Assumpsit provided
the outlines for Torts and Contracts, respectively, and Property was
gathered together from several different writs. Thus, procedure came
to be seen as so independent of substance that that oldest of
procedurally based distinctions, law and equity, disappeared with the
one civil action created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Now, no one would argue that the set of categories created in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was perfect or has
come down to us unadulterated. For instance, the course in Quasi-
Contracts, contracts made without explicit agreement, represented by
the Writ of Indebatus Assumpsit, died a quick and painless death.
Also listed among the departed are Bailments, Carriers, Mortgages
and Suretyship; on life support are Agency, Future Interests and
Negotiable Instruments; and many schools have waved goodbye to the
full year of the classic three common law subjects as well as the once
"required" aspect of a dozen or so courses.
Still, in a legal world that is overwhelmingly statutory, there is
no first-year course rooted in a statute. Contracts has not morphed
into Commercial Law, Torts into Insurance Law I or Property into
Land Use Planning. Even Criminal Law, a course founded on the
proposition that all crimes must be statutory, starts with theories of
punishment and focuses on homicide and theft, the most common law-
like of crimes. Likewise, Civil Procedure spends the least time on
discovery, the most statutory-heavy part of pre-trial practice, and even
strict constructionists have to fulminate against a Constitution that is
as much a matter of common law as that horrid example of legal
excreta, the English "unwritten" constitution.
On the other side of the great divide that a law student crosses
his or her first summer stands a curriculum that in its cornucopia of
delights makes it clear that the old categories no longer make much
sense. Name a sexy topic-election law is the latest, God Bless Bush v.
Gore-and there one finds a course that either follows a statute in
detail or synthesizes material from all over the categories of the pre-
World War II curriculum. There is no grand intellectual structure left,
but the elective system hides this fact, as does the treaty that
separates first year from upper division teachers.
Why has this intellectual house of cards not collapsed? First,
consider the sociological aspects of the matter, the profession that is
law teaching. The profession as we know it today was created at about
374 [Vol. 60:2:371
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the same time as the rest of the university disciplines-the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Significantly, this was at
about the same time the current curricular structure fell into place. As
part of this collective exercise of academic product differentiation, the
law professors chose (or were left with, because no one else wanted)
the rules of law as their separate special subject matter and "thinking
like a lawyer" as their separate special method. Notice particularly,
the choice of method. It was not "acting like a lawyer," except in the
narrow sense that the focus on the rules of law evoked one aspect of
the appellate practice of lawyers and judges, the somewhat unusual
circumstance where the question of what is the proper rule of law is
central to an appeal, rather than evidentiary issues or other
procedural matters.
The interesting part of this choice is that the point of the
teaching of the first full-time law professors was relatively continuous
with that of the part-time teachers-retired judges and unsuccessful
lawyers-who were the law professors of the earlier years of the
nineteenth century. The content of the instruction delivered at that
earlier time was, at least in part, an exercise in justification. This
exercise implicitly argued that the existing rules of law, while not
perfect-that would have been implausible-were, overall, acceptable.
Criticism, if limited to circumstances at the edges of the rules of law,
was quite proper and often offered, but criticism of the core was
neither acceptable, nor tendered. Langdell's case method class
changed this lecture-based monologue of justification into the
pedagogically more effective-at least if drawing forth the implicit
assent of the student was the objective-dialogue that we call Socratic.
Otherwise, it changed nothing. Part of the object of every class
remained justification by occasional criticism, a method of justification
that has proven to be mighty resilient. Indeed, it survived intact as, in
the middle years of the twentieth century, the grounds for justification
shifted from the slippery ground of logical entailment to the different,
but equally slippery, ground of policy acceptability.
For the legal academic, the choice of the law school's subject
matter and method was Fat City. First, one got to play judge, always a
heady activity for one so far from the bench. Second, scholarship in the
discipline required no messy social science-y fieldwork. Someone else
created the materials for research, and then the postal service
delivered them to the library. Third, one didn't really have to know
anything about what "real lawyers" did all day, which in any case
obviously appeared to be mostly a tedious routine accompanied with
the worry that clients might not appear, or if they appeared, not pay
for services rendered. And fourth, even in the early years the salaries
were generous by standards elsewhere in the university system. The
20071 375
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only downside was the need to grade great quantities of exams, a
complaint that persists unabated today.
Little has changed to make being a law professor any less of an
exercise in light lifting. True, getting tenure has become more
difficult. But teaching has become easier. US News rankings and the
LSAT have combined to make student ability more uniform within
each school, and the growth of faculty has both reduced teaching loads
and increased the possibilities for specialization. The supposed rigor of
the Socratic method has largely died out, as has the rigor of grading
except at those schools that unaccountably support a mandatory curve
for an academically all-but-homogenous group of students. Moreover,
at least in many schools, salary growth in the Law School has far
outpaced that in the College of Arts and Sciences. How could one
complain?
Well, of course, I can and do complain. As always, I am the
skunk at the garden party, the person whose job is to say, "that idea
just ain't radical enough to make much of a difference in so
entrenched a social formation as the American law school." So, what
do I have to complain about? To mangle a quote from Marlon Brando,
"Whaddya got time for?" After all, once in my life I was known for
being able to create a new and different first year curriculum on
request. Today, in a more expansive mood, I will offer a full three
years of law study.
I begin with an observation that I believe is true, but that I will
not take your time to defend, that "if you want to do something new,
you have to think something new." I wish to locate my something new
in an observation that Bayless Manning, fancy Yale Law Professor,
fancy Stanford Dean and fancy Wall Street lawyer, made over fifteen
years ago. He hazarded that the lawyer's favorite verb was the verb
"to do." 4 Just what do lawyers do all day that might ground a law
school's entire curriculum?
Let me get out of the way something that is not coming next.
What follows is not a plea for more clinical education. I have trashed
the MacCrate report previously 5 and am not afraid of getting into
4. Cf. Bayless Manning, From Learned Profession to Learned Business, 37 BUFF. L. REV.
658 (1989) (providing a much edited version of a livelier oral presentation).
5. See Law and Endangered Species, supra note 1. The MacCrate Report, named for
Robert MacCrate, chair of the group that produced the document, is properly known as
Narrowing the Gap: Legal Education and Professional Development - An Educational
Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEG. EDUC. & ADMISSION TO BAR 1. It is generally understood that
the panel was dominated by clinicians and that its recommendations instantiated a particular,
disputable view of clinical legal education that underpins its emphasis on the "skills and values"
necessary for the practice of law. It argued that law is a "unitary profession with its core body of
knowledge, skills and values, common educational requirements and shared professional
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further hot water with clinicians. Clinical legal education, as it is
contemporarily delivered in most schools, has as its purpose both the
salving of the conscience of liberal law professors and the amusement
of students with short attention spans and a fear of having their
values compromised. The sanitized version of practice to which we
expose our students in our clinics is captured by the following,
crucially imperfect, analogy: clinical legal education is to what lawyers
do as a good night kiss is to the best night of sex you can imagine.
Good lawyers are passionate and sweaty. Their work goes hot and
heavy, on and on, without enough sleep. Unfortunately, however, the
practice of law, pace W.H. Auden, 6 has nothing to do with love or even
lust, unless it be the lust for money. Nor is it an heroic activity.
Lawyers are significantly less like the ethically reflective practitioner
of the clinical literature, than like the Greek god Charon, ferrying
souls across the rivers of Hate, Woe, Forgetfulness, Wailing and Fire,
hopefully to the Elysian fields, but oft times to a much less hospitable
place. And don't forget to bring the coin to pay the ferryman or you
will not even get in the boat!
So in the pursuit of the verb "to do," let me start with what
lawyers don't. They don't do much appellate work and they don't do
much trial work. Except for new associates, they don't do much legal
research and writing, and no one would confuse memo writing, which
they don't do, with the endless letters giving unwelcome advice to a
client, or worse, the detailed reports of events that didn't lead to
closing on a matter that a client cares about, which they do do. On the
further down side, lawyers do go to lots of inconclusive meetings, do a
lot of discovery, prepare lots of documents, and in between spend lots
of time on the phone or sending and receiving e-mail. They also spend
much time on planes, in cars, in hotel rooms, eating bad takeout,
schmoozing with public and private officials whose blessing or money
a client needs, and, of course, not getting enough sleep. They are
themselves bureaucrats busy satisfying the needs of public and
private bureaucracies (including their own law firms, it should be
remembered) for obeisance, paper, and the diminution of the fear of
things that go bump, either in the public press or in the dark of night.
No one would do this job if paid only in course credits, much less pay
tuition for the pleasure.
Thus, if one is going to make something out of Bayless
Manning's aphorism, one must abstract somewhat from what lawyers
do as a daily matter. Such abstraction is commonly known as theory
standards." Id. at 86. From this litany the only assertion that might withstand empirical
analysis is that of "common educational standards," and even that assertion is dubious.
6. See W.H. AUDEN, Law Like Love, in THE COLLECTED POETRY OF W. H. AUDEN 74 (1945).
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-descriptive theory, not the normative swill that passes for theory in
law school classrooms and journals. Descriptive theory is often
captured in images. My favorite positive image of a lawyer at work is
not that of Charon in his boat, but of a wilderness trail guide leading
people though a thicket, some rough terrain with many switchbacks
and perhaps some swampy areas, to a desired destination - sometimes
a quiet lake, other times a mining claim, still other times just to the
other side of the forest. In doing such work, the guide needs to know a
good deal about what the client wants and even more about the local
rocks, rivers, flora, and fauna. Only for lawyers, none of the terrain is
picturesque and none of the fauna, cute. The terrain is bureaucratic
and the bureaucrats in it, whether public or private, are likely to be
indifferent to the client's passing and not particularly cuddly.
Note, there is nothing in this image close to classroom law.
This omission is intentional. Somewhere between the foreground of
client needs and the background of social institutions may be found
some legal doctrine, the stuff that no matter what we say, we actually
teach, because we regularly test. Sometimes this layer of rules is
relatively thick-I think of the rules of law in tax practice as being
relatively thick in this sense. Sometimes it is quite thin-I think of the
rules of law in much corporate practice in this sense. Sometimes
lawyers use the rules of law to bridge the gap between the client and
the institutions-I think of the bulk of criminal practice in this sense.
Other times the rules of law are used to avoid that gap-I think of
much of securities practice in this sense. But I never think of the role
of law as rule in practice in any classroom sense, for the structure of
practice-background of institutions, foreground of client
circumstance and mid-ground of rule systems of varying thicknesses-
is not to be captured in the normative justification by doctrinal
elaboration that is the common content of the law school classroom.
Rather, Bayless Manning's language best captures the role of legal
rules in law practice: Lawyers do things with rules, but only when
rules turn out to be useful tools to the project at hand. 7 Thus, as my
colleague, Milton Kaplan, theorized many years ago in a piece that
deserved to be published in a less obscure place, the practice of law
can be seen in the image of a checker board-black squares, law; white
squares, not law.8 Lawyers move across the board stringing moves
together in whatever order the problem presents-for example, white,
7. For a dissimilar use of the same metaphor, see WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERS, How
TO Do THINGS WITH RULES: A PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION (1976), a work that is intentionally
modeled on J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
8. Milton Kaplan, The Colonia and Fudalia Tapes: Dialogues on Legal Change and Shelter
for the Urban Poor, 1 URB. L. & POLY 349, 379-80 (1978).
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white, white, black, white, black, white-and almost any other
conceivable sequence, limited only by ethical rules against bribery and
excessive self-interest.
The first year categories are not very helpful in filling out the
image of the practicing lawyer either as trail guide or as checker
player. The most helpful is Civil Procedure, but to the extent that
course is about anything, it is about orderliness; thus, it would make
more sense were it combined with the untaught, purely procedural
part of criminal procedure and the procedural part of administrative
law. The great questions of personal jurisdiction, collateral estoppel,
the process that is due, and federal-state relations are much less tied
to the doing of procedure than is the study of proof, especially
relevance, which is never included in the course. Torts, beyond the
simple notion of wrong, and so standard of care, is of no general use in
most practices, and Contracts, actually the law of incomplete or
missing documents, is useful only for questions of interpretation and
performance, which are seldom, if ever, the centerpiece of the law
school course. Property is a grab bag held together by a final exam;
Criminal and Constitutional Law, excursions into political theory,
when not simply occasions for disciplining the rhetoric of political life
by studying examples of its use. The course in research and writing is
useful only to the extent that it is preparation for the experience of
intense boredom, admixed with the terror of not understanding what
one is doing, that is an associate's position in a bad law firm.
Upper-division courses fit better with the notion of lawyer as
wilderness guide, at least if one appends to the image the fact that
there are all sorts of highly specialized guides, depending on where a
client wants to go. Some existing courses track real legal practices
quite well, at least as far as the narrow rule content of that practice is
concerned. Federal Taxation is a good example. Environmental Law,
unfortunately a dying practice area, is another. Labor and
Employment Law tracks some lawyers' practices, or at least it would if
a heavy dose of counseling directed at avoiding law were central to it.
At the other extreme, Administrative Law, Constitutional Law,
Conflict of Laws, and Federal Jurisdiction track no legal practice. In
between are all sorts of courses that contribute to one or another legal
practice. Corporations is a modestly helpful underpinning to a
corporate practice, but not as important as would be a course in
financing business activity, a distant relative of the Corporate Finance
course. Health Law might track part of a practice were it to spend lots
of time on insurer and governmental reimbursement, though even
then it surely would miss all of the employment issues. And Family
Law might track a discrete practice, if it did not avoid all of the very
2007] 379
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complex issues about finances that are crucial for all clients who
darken the family lawyer's door.
By now my empirical point ought to be apparent. Even the
upper division courses that track the identifiable practices-in the
sense of both clients' typical problems and lawyers' routine activities-
do not do this very well, though some will manage to examine rather
exhaustively some narrowly rule bound aspects of the area in
question. However, the only "to do" that holds many of them together
is the "to take an exam on this swatch of doctrine without more than a
passing consideration of the socio-economic background or the detailed
foreground that is a typical client." And the first year courses offer no
recognizable theory that might explain the contours of the practices
that are touched on in the upper division. Thus, what is really wrong
with law school is that its category system offers little theory in the
classic social science sense. That is, law school is full of normative
theory that tends to reify the prejudices of either the law or the law
professor and little practice. Practice, in this sense, would be the
systematic examination of how theories about the practices of lawyers
might work out by exploring in significant depth the actual practices
of lawyers.
If the old categories are not very helpful and so need to be
abandoned if one wants to try to change legal education significantly,
the question of what ought to be substituted in their place is surely a
question on the mind of every reader who has not already decided that
I should be either shunned or tarred, feathered, and ridden out of
town on a rail. In truth, I am not terribly interested in this subject any
more. I cannot imagine that whatever would be substituted for the old
categories could be any worse than what we have now. So, as long as a
school tried to fill the first year with theories about the practices of
law and the second two with some representative practices in which
lawyers make the comfortable living to which most students aspire,
and as long as the school made clear that an intensive exposure to any
one such practice would be helpful in whatever area a student
eventually pursues, I would be pleased to watch what would transpire.
But, I know that no one will take me even modestly seriously unless I
offer some concrete suggestions. So, here goes this month's law school
curriculum, catalogue ready.
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First Year
Fall Semester
* Doctrinal Structures. How bodies of law are typically
organized, whether common law or statute, with special
emphasis on recurrent patterns and significant
variants.
* Doctrinal Tools. The basic building blocks with which
legal arguments are made, including distinctions such
as public/private, rule/standard, rule/exception, and
concepts such as estoppel, laches, unclean hands, and
especially the contextual appropriateness that is the
notion of wrong.
* Backgrounds: Bureaucracies. An exploration of the basic
ordering principles that underlie the most common
organizational structures of public and private
institutions, with special emphasis on incentives not to
act.
* Backgrounds: Money. A detailed examination of the
economic structure of the United States, with special
emphasis on financial institutions of all kinds.
* Backgrounds: Social Inequality. A detailed examination
of the social structure of the United States, with a
special emphasis on the middle classes.
Spring Semester
* Doctrine in Detail. A single, conventionally defined
doctrinal area, chosen for the convenience of the
instructor, examined for the purpose of exploring the
extent to which this area follows the structures and
tools explored in the first semester.
* Order. The commonality of procedure across legal
institutions, as well as that involved in such legal
activities as the closing of a major purchase or credit
agreement and the operation of a representative
legislature in a party system.
* Practices: Routine. The daily activities of lawyers,
including drafting from models and developing plans for
action.
* Practices: Differentiated. The structure of the bar and of
a selection of practice areas within it.
20071
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* Writing. Client letters (writing law for non-lawyers) and
representative legal documents will be prepared until
the student is capable of journeyman work. Individual
students will be required to continue this course in




* Practice I. A single conventionally defined practice area,
explored in detail, including the necessary additional
social and economic background and specialized
doctrine, with an emphasis on the common practices of
lawyers specializing in that area. Representative
transactions will be reviewed in detail and at length,
utilizing actual practice materials. Preparation of
documents appropriate to the particular area of practice
will be required. (12 credits over 2 semesters) 9
* Practice II. A single conventionally defined practice
area, explored in detail, including the necessary
additional social and economic background and
specialized doctrine, with an emphasis on the common
practices of lawyers specializing in that area.
Representative transactions will be reviewed in detail
and at length, utilizing actual practice materials.
Preparation of documents appropriate to the particular
area of practice will be required. (12 credits over 2
semesters)
* Self-Teaching Doctrine. Using the knowledge of the
structures and tools developed in the First Year,
students may select areas of doctrine that traditionally
appear on state bar exams for self-study and short
answer examination. (1 or 2 credits each: 3 credits per
semester)
9. I would insert in this and similar courses a clinical experience for all students were it
not the case that the bar would go postal if law schools were to begin offering clinics in areas
where fees are regularly charged, if not earned, by numerous of its members. I find it interesting,
even hopeful, that one of the participants in this conference, Nicholas Zeppos, the University's
Provost and a member of the Vanderbilt law faculty, suggested the establishment of such fee
generating clinics on the model of clinical practices in medical schools.
[Vol. 60:2:371382
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By this point, it should be painfully obvious that the two-year
sequence I have laid out proceeds generally from theory to practice,
with only the modest deviations of a simple writing course in the
second semester of the first year and the self-teaching courses for bar
exam preparation purposes during the second. It ought also be
apparent that there is more real theory in this curriculum than in the
entire three years of law school today. It is "academic" with a
vengeance, just not academic as theory types today use that loaded
word or as students use it to disparage our efforts. Personally, I would
reverse the sequence and build theory out of practice examples, but
there is much to be said for dealing didactically with things that can
be dealt with didactically, and besides, my preferred ordering would
bring more anxiety to many first year students than even is the case
today.10
It ought also be reasonably obvious that after these two years
the necessary part of any law student's education would be complete.
Not that it will turn out to be so, as Preble Stolz made clear years
ago;" the transition costs of going to a two-year law school are more
than any law faculty can support. Given that we cannot get rid of the
appendix that is the third year, I don't think it matters much what
gets taught in it. But, to finish my job, I will simply say that my third
year would consist of either Practice III, or for those students who fell
in love with either Practice I or II, an advanced version of their love,
plus another year of Self-Teaching Doctrine and whatever stuff from
the old curriculum that had to be preserved as a matter of political
compromise with late-middle-aged faculty.
So, as I suppose you have figured out by now, Gerhard Casper
was right. I am a revolutionary. But, I have no interest in
exterminating the kulaks. I truly believe that the kulaks can be re-
educated, and not in the Maoist sense either. I have re-educated
myself before, and it has been the most fun of my entire academic
career, other than the occasional summers or parts of sabbaticals
when the writing has gone well. But whether or not you agree about
re-education, much less find my curriculum intriguing, I think I have
demonstrated the way in which the greatest impediment to the reform
10. I should note that I am beginning to believe that this is not the case for a growing
portion of law students at other than the fanciest law schools. Those students who fail to earn
the gold ring of acceptance at one of the fifteen or twenty law schools that claim that in a well-
run world they would be included in the top ten, the reward always proffered during seventeen to
twenty years on the academic treadmill exude a "teach me, I dare you" attitude. It is possible
that this attitude can most readily be undermined by eschewing theory until practice is well
understood.
11. See Preble Stolz, The Two- Year Law School: The Day the Music Died, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC.
37 (1973) (describing the rejection of an ABA proposal that would have authorized law schools to
grant degrees to students completing two years of study).
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of legal education is not the bar or the profession or the students; it is
our attachment to the categories within which we teach. Questions
about the full-year contracts course or about Torts in the first
semester versus Torts in the second or the required course in
corporations or even of a required clinical experience do not make for
reform. Such questions are, however, not to be compared with
rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic, for the old craft of legal
education is not about to sink. Rather, they are much like re-
arranging the squares on a Rubik's Cube for the aesthetic pleasure of
the patterns of color-well worth doing, but not worth fighting about.
So, as I wish you well on your way to curriculum reform, I will
end by saying that I hope you make a significant change in legal
education at Vanderbilt; every little bit helps. But, unless you are
going to change fundamentally the categories within which that
education is taught, do not fight about that change. The resulting
destruction of social relations is not worth it, and besides, the new
patterns on your Rubik's Cube just might be lovely to contemplate.
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